International Claims Arising from Iraq\u27s Invasion of Kuwait by Glod, Stanley J.
STANLEY J. GLOD*
International Claims Arising from
Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait**
Now that the dust of battle has settled in the Persian Gulf, the first real test of
a new world order may indeed come in the form of establishing a regime for the
payment of Iraq for damages and losses caused by its invasion and occupation of
Kuwait, with all the ensuing consequences of its forcible expulsion. The creation
of such a regime may indeed prove more problematical than the creation of an
allied coalition to meet the threat, and the formation of an acceptable security
arrangement to preserve peace in the region.
In the past, claims settlements usually involved bilateral negotiations between
two nations, culminating in a lump-sum settlement agreement against which
individual claims would then be adjudicated. Additional funds could be made
available from the liquidation of foreign assets in the United States by the
Departments of Justice or Treasury, and from public funds when provided by
Congress. National claims commissions, such as the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission of the United States (the Commission), operated relatively success-
fully in the disposition of large numbers of claims representing losses by its
citizens, corporate entities, and government institutions. In the United States, for
example, this was true for a number of claims programs following World War II
involving such nations as Bulgaria, the People's Republic of China, Czechoslo-
vakia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, the former German Democratic Republic, Hun-
gary, Italy, Panama, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Yugo-
slavia, all of which were administered under the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949, as amended.1 This function also involved twenty-one programs
administered under the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended, the Micronesian
Claims Act of 1971, as amended, and other statutory authority.
More recently, following the hostage crisis and takeover of the United States
embassy in Iran in 1979, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was created by
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the Algiers Accords of 1981,2 the instrument which also provided for the release
of our hostages. As of January 1991 the Tribunal has handled nearly 500 U.S.
claims against Iran. Composed of three panels, each consisting of three judges,
one each from Iran, the United States, and a third country, usually Western
European, the Tribunal was often criticized for internal bickering, protracted
delays, and high cost of operation. 3 Nevertheless, however one may view the
outcome, the contribution of the Tribunal to evolving a structure for international
dispute resolution has been both unique and significant.
In this vein, it is also worth noting that in May 1990 both Iran and the United
States agreed upon a lump-sum settlement wherein some 3,100 remaining
claims, valued at less than $250,000 per claim, were transferred from the Tri-
bunal to the Commission for adjudication, thus effectively signaling the conclu-
sion of the fiscal dispute between the two nations.
On January 12, 1991, shortly after receiving congressional authorization to
launch Operation Desert Storm, President Bush held a press conference during
which he not unwittingly focused on the issue of reparations and compensation.
In referring to the unprecedented chain of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions aimed at condemning Iraq for its invasion and occupation of Kuwait,
the President stated that: "One of them relates to reparations, and reparations is
a very important part of this. It is a very important part of what the United
Nations has done. ' 4 Given the presidential emphasis, the issue becomes critical
and certainly one for the immediate attention of the leadership in the executive
and legislative branches of government.
The President's remarks were not without precedent in that on October 29,
1990, the United Nations Security Council by its Resolution 674, rendered a
stunning indictment:
Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take third-State
nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and third-State nationals, and
other actions reported to the Security Council, such as the destruction of Kuwaiti
demographic records, the forced departure of Kuwaitis, the relocation of population in
Kuwait, and the unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private property in
Kuwait, including hospital supplies and equipment, in violation of the decision of
the Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular relations and international law...
2. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established in 1981 pursuant to the Declaration
of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration and the
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria) concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), collectively referred to as the Algiers
Accords. For the rest of the text of the Algiers Accords, see l IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 3 (1981-82), 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 418 (1981).
3. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of
International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104-05 (1990).
4. The President's News Conference, Jan. 12, 1991, 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 41 (Jan. 18,
1991).
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and further,
reaffirming that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High
Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and
in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed
by it, as are individuals who commit or order the Commission of grave breaches
Resolution 674 subsequently
Reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury
arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a
result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;
and points to a future claims process whereby it
invites States to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their
nationals and corporations, for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view
to such arrangements as may be established in accordance with international law ....
The Security Council's action was historically unique in issuing what is tan-
tamount to a summary judgment holding Iraq responsible for a whole series of
breaches of international law. Not unlike the United Nations mandate, the Com-
mission historically has performed the function of fact finder and/or loss assessor
at various times in the past, and is well equipped to do so in connection with
claims against Iraq. In addition, Congress has envisioned this type of role for the
Commission in past legislation. In the Hickenlooper Amendment, 6 enacted in
1963 as an addition to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President was
given the authority to direct the Commission to undertake similar fact-finding
tasks with regard to U.S. nationals' claims against foreign governments.
Indeed, as early as October 24, 1990, Congressman Dante B. Fascell, chair-
man of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a bill entitled Iraq
Claims of 1990, 7 which provided that:
2. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission shall be authorized to receive and
evaluate claims against Iraq resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait related either to
losses directly resulting from Iraq's action or indirectly from steps taken to comply with
sanctions imposed in compliance with the United Nations. Such claims may include
compensation for increased security efforts required by state and local governments and
persons and corporations to counter possible terrorist activities by Iraq.
3. From Iraq funds now frozen by the United States the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission is authorized to pay assistance to the families of hostages held in Iraq such
funds as may be judged necessary to permit dependents of such hostages to continue to
have funds that otherwise would have been available to pay for activities such as but not
limited to: food, housing, education, health, and taxes due. The aggregate money set
aside for such payments shall be subject to approval by the President.
Not insignificantly, the bill went on to state that:
6. The Congress approves the efforts of the President to seek United Nations action
regarding claims against Iraq and urges the President to seek an international claims
5. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (Oct. 29, 1990).
6. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e).
7. A bill number was not assigned to the proposed legislation.
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regime and to press for reparations from Iraq for damage done to Kuwait and to seek
indemnity for all United States expenses and claims associated with Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait.
Since the bill was introduced in the closing days of the 101st Congress, it
proceeded no further in the legislative process. Subsequent language was added,
with appropriate citations, by the staff of the Commission.
Similar activity in other western capitals was occurring almost simultaneously.
Shortly before the United Nations adopted Resolution 674, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom advertised in the British media as
follows:
Notification of loss and damage suffered by UK nationals and companies in Kuwait and
Iraq. United Kingdom nationals and companies whose property in Kuwait or Iraq has
been lost, damaged, or destroyed, or who have suffered personal injury, as a conse-
quence of the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait are invited to notify their losses
to Her majesty's Government, so that a list can be opened. (This will not constitute
submission of a claim.)
A special claims information form entitled, "Particulars of Property Owned by
British Nationals in the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Which Has Been
Lost, Damaged, or Destroyed, and of Any Personal Injury," was made available
by the Foreign Office and were disseminated to potential claimants for completion.
With regard to claims by private nationals, the United States conducted a
systematic census of potential claims by both natural and juridical persons. On
February 11, 1991, the United States published a formal notice of such a census
8
and has undertaken other appropriate publicity measures to encourage its nation-
als to provide claims information to the government. Since the beginning of
Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the Commission and other U.S. gov-
ernment agencies have received countless unsolicited communications from in-
dividuals and corporations reporting a wide range of tangible and intangible
losses. With the institution of a formal procedure to obtain information on
claims, the United States hopes to develop a comprehensive accounting of Iraq's
potential liability to private American nationals and corporations.
Specifically, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Department of
Treasury, amended the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations 9 by providing for census of
blocked assets of the Government of Iraq and a census of claims against that
government. 10 The amendments require that reports be filed: (1) with respect to
blocked Iraqi assets held by any U.S. national on or after August 2, 1990, and
8. 31 C.F.R. pt. 575 (1991).
9. 31 C.F.R. pt. 575, 56 Fed. Reg. 2112 (Jan. 18, 1991) (the Regulations), were issued by the
Treasury Department in implementation of Executive Order No. 12,722 of Aug. 2, 1990, 55 Fed.
Reg. 3183 (Aug. 3, 1990); Executive Order No. 12,724 of Aug. 9, 1990, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (Aug.
13, 1990); and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution No. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990), and
subsequent relevant resolutions.
10. 31 C.F.R. pt. 575 (1991).
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(2) with respect to claims held by U.S. nationals against the Government of Iraq
as of 5 p.m. January 16, 1991.11 The amendments define a "United States
national" as "any United States citizen; any person who, though not a citizen of
the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States; and any
juridical person organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction
within the United States." 12 This term does not include U.S. branches of persons
organized under foreign law, or aliens (with or without permanent residency in
the United States). 13
OFAC forms TDF 90-22.40 and TDF 90-22.41 seek information, for planning
and administrative purposes, on a one-time basis, regarding blocked Iraqi assets
and claims by U.S. nationals against the Government of Iraq. This census re-
sponds, in part, to United Nations Security Council Resolution 674 of October
29, 1990, which, as previously mentioned, invited U.N. member states to collect
information on claims against the Government of Iraq. Note that submission of
a form regarding a claim against the Government of Iraq does not constitute the
filing of a formal claim for compensation with the United States Government.
However, failure to file a complete report with respect to claims in a timely
fashion constitutes failure to comply with Regulations as well as prevents the
inclusion of the information in U.S. government planning and may be prejudicial
to the interests of the claimant and other U.S. claimants.
As for losses sustained by the United States Government itself, preliminary
information on certain categories of losses, particularly in the area of agricultural
credits, has been developed. As with private losses, the United States has un-
dertaken a systematic survey of its agencies and instrumentalities to determine
the full range of losses sustained by the government.
Aside from the claims for losses incurred between August 2, 1990, and Jan-
uary 16, 1991, the outbreak of hostilities with Iraq on January 16, 1991, trig-
gered the involvement of additional statutory authority. Pursuant to title I of the
War Claims Act of 1948,14 and amendments thereto, the Commission and its
predecessor, the War Claims Commission, were authorized to administer ten
prisoner-of-war and civilian-internee compensation programs, covering World
War II, the Korean conflict, and the military and civilian personnel assigned to
duty on board the U.S.S. Pueblo who were captured, along with the vessel, by
the military forces of North Korea on January 23, 1968, and thereafter impris-
oned by the Government of North Korea. 15
Further, under the authority of title II of the Act 16 the Commission adminis-
tered the General War Claims Program. In this program the Commission deter-
11. Id. pt. 575.604.
12. Id. pt. 575.322.
13. Id.
14. Pub. L. No. 80-896, 62 Stat. 1240 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2001).
15. War Claims Act of 1948, § 6(e), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2005(e).
16. Pub. L. No. 87-846, 76 Stat. 1107 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2017).
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mined claims of nationals of the United States for loss or destruction of, or
physical damage to, property located in certain specified areas of Europe and the
Pacific and for certain deaths and personal injuries resulting from military op-
erations during World War II.
It is important to note that the payments of claims and administrative expenses
of all but three programs were derived from the liquidation of Japanese and
German assets under the control of the Attorney General of the United States,
which had been blocked and vested in the United States during World War II
under the Trading with the Enemy Act, rather than from monies appropriated
from the general revenues of the United States. These funds were deposited in
the War Claims Fund, a special fund set up in the Department of the Treasury for
this purpose. The three exceptions mentioned above are the prisoner of war and
civilian internee claims programs involving the Korean conflict and the U.S.S.
Pueblo incident. Funds for payment of claims and expenses of these programs
were appropriated by the Congress.
It is envisioned that a similar disposition of claims is warranted in the Iraqi
scenario. The macabre parading of obviously maltreated American pilots and
other prisoners of war before television cameras in Baghdad certainly gives rise
to many claims under this statute. When taken together with other torture and
murder inflicted upon innocent civilians both in Iraq and Kuwait, including the
taking and use of hostages as human shields against anticipated allied air attacks,
the pattern of conduct indicates a gross culpability for war crimes, a subject
matter which is not addressed herein. In this instance, each process has its own
function, with the accomplishment of one not foreclosing the other. Suffice to say
that the pattern of abuse, torture, rape, and murder of innocent victims conjures
up the images of atrocities not visited upon the world possibly since World War
II, and constitutes the gravest breaches of all accepted standards of international
law. It is submitted that the importance attached by President Bush to payment
of claims and reparations bespeaks the present necessity of enforcing interna-
tional law. The situation has gotten significantly out of hand so that any discus-
sion of other options, restitution, or status quo ante simply becomes moot.
The issue for immediate attention is the necessity to update and amend the War
Claims Act of 1948 in order to provide compensation for U.S. servicemen
maltreated by Iraq while held as prisoners of war. The Commission advised
Congress of this need for amendment in late January 1991, and current action by
that body is awaited.
Aside from a number of objections that will no doubt ensue, we are left with
the one viable option of vigorously pursuing the claims and compensation avenue
as a meaningful measure of enforcing international law. Arguments as to Ku-
wait's wealth versus the relative poverty of Iraq and its consequent inability to
pay are immaterial and suggest a misreading of the facts and history itself. One
need only point to the number of successful claims programs conducted by the
Commission involving war-ravaged and poverty-stricken countries of Eastern
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Europe, which made payments over the years in satisfaction of settlement agree-
ments. In addition, to suggest that a claims process places Iraq's reconstruction
and financial future in jeopardy is akin to advocating a thesis that tyrants who
squander their natural and human resources in pursuit of military adventures gain
immunity from any further accounting before international tribunals for their
wrongs.
As President Bush has stated on a number of occasions, this is not simply a
United States versus Iraq situation. Losses and suffering have been endured by
thousands of third-country nationals and corporations, as well as by foreign
workers who were expelled from Kuwait by the invasion and consequently
harbor serious claims against Iraq. Other states, such as Turkey, the democra-
tizing nations of central and eastern Europe, and indeed most of the civilized
world that supported the United Nations sanctions against Iraq, likewise have
amassed legitimate claims for substantial losses in both human and economic
terms.
The process of rebuilding Iraq with eventual economic assistance even to the
extent of a Marshall Plan model, does not exculpate it either from the respon-
sibility for payment, or the determination of an actual payment schedule. Lend-
ing credibility and substance to the latter theory is Iraq's considerable oil re-
serves. It is not an unlikely scenario for the imposition of a surcharge or levy to
be applied to each barrel of oil produced for export over a period of years,
thereby creating a trust fund or pool against which claims may be adjudicated.
Likewise, the vesting of Iraqi frozen assets in the United States for the purpose
of paying valid claims would provide an additional source of funds.
Finally, the question of an adequate forum for the disposition of claims re-
mains as an interesting one for lawyers to ponder. The debate largely turns on
whether such a tribunal is organized along multilateral (multinational) or bilateral
lines. A multinational or international claims tribunal is without precedent and,
therefore, difficult to address with specificity. Our closest comparison to a pos-
sibly multilateral claims tribunal could probably be made with the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal at The Hague. That experience has taught us that, despite
relative success for the scope of claims encountered in the Iranian scenario, a
similar tribunal might not meet the needs or expectations following the tragic
devastation flowing from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. This experience further
shows that a multilateral tribunal would pose many sensitive legal problems as to
its composition by nationality, appointing authorities, funding, classes of cases
(government, corporate, and individual claims), priorities of adjudication and
payment, form and timeliness of payment, and the like. One could also argue
that the delay in payments generated by a multilateral tribunal, given its very
nature, and the resulting lack or loss of control, real or perceived, by nations that
substantially contributed to bringing an end to hostilities would pose many do-
mestic political problems. Conversely, the creation of a bilateral claims tribunal,
although domestically and politically advantageous, could elicit international
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criticism as to an inherent inequity and disparity in the treatment of claimants,
the concomitant diminution of total funds available for an international claims
process, and other unspecified inequities that inevitably ensue from a perceived
form of preferential treatment.
The conclusion remains clear in one respect: serious planning for a claims
adjudication process, at least in the United States, should begin now. The fact
that the United States has a national claims commission, the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, already in place serves as a basic start in that direction.
It is also clear that any post-war planning such as is under way in several
agencies of government, must of necessity consist of a triad of elements, espe-
cially given the recent history in the Middle East. These can be conveniently
organized as follows:
(a) Establishment of a regional security arrangement to preserve peace and
stability in the area.
(b) Provide for the reconstruction of Iraq and Kuwait to include financial
assistance modeled on a Marshall Plan.
(c) Commence a process of reconciliation, which incorporates two dominant
features, namely: the bringing to justice of responsible perpetrators for their war
crimes; and, the creation of a framework for a claims process, which would
provide for the payment of compensation and reparations to individuals, entities,
institutions, and governments that sustained damages or losses at the hands of
perpetrators.
Anything less than the complete implementation of this triad would create a
formula for future disaster. Not only would it not promote a lasting peace in the
Middle East, it would foster continued unrest for decades to come. Recognizing
these pitfalls, President Bush, speaking for all coalition members on February 19,
1991, wisely rejected the Soviet peace initiative as insufficient, stating that: "It falls
well short of what may be required." 17 Among other shortcomings, it failed to
address Iraq's responsibility for the payment of reparations. In his statement issued
shortly before the commencement of the ground war during the evening hours of
February 23, 1991, the President succinctly said that: "The liberation of Kuwait has
now entered a final phase."' 18 With it also came the ultimate enforcement of the
principles of international law.
Following the conclusion of the "Hundred Hours War," and the resounding
defeat of Iraqi forces, the United Nations Security Council on April 3, 1991,
reaffirmed Iraq's liability for war damages under international law and voted to
require that Iraq pay economic reparations for any losses and damages inflicted
17. Exchange with Reporters on the Soviet Peace Proposal for the Persian Gulf Conflict, Feb. 19,
1991, 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 185 (Feb. 25, 1991).
18. Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Ground Action in the Persian Gulf
Conflict, Feb. 23, 1991, 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 207 (Mar. 4, 1991).
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as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 19 A month later,
the Secretary General filed his report listing various recommendations for car-
rying out this resolution.
Chief among these was the creation of a U.N. compensation fund to function
under the direct authority of the Security Council and a commission to administer
the fund. Composed of a fifteen member governing council representing member
nations of the Security Council, the commission's policy decisions would be
governed by a majority of at least nine of its members, with no one country
having a veto power. If a consensus is lacking, questions could then be referred
to the Security Council on the request of any member of the governing council.
This council, to be located in Geneva, would appoint commissioners to adjudi-
cate the claims.
The report recommends that governments file claims on their own behalf and
on behalf of their nationals and corporations, suggesting, however, that claims
concerning individuals be disposed of first. Notably, "It will be for each indi-
vidual Government to decide on the procedures to be followed internally in
respect of the consolidation of the claim having regard to its own legal system,
practice, and procedure.' 20 However, the report concludes that: "It is clear from
paragraph 16 of the resolution that the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior
to 2 August 1990 are an entirely separate issue and will be addressed 'through the
normal mechanisms'. " 2 1 Recognizing that individuals will attempt to sue Iraq
through their domestic legal systems, the report suggests the establishment of
guidelines to coordinate overlapping claims.
Procedurally, it is envisioned that the U.N. secretariat would make a prelim-
inary assessment to determine whether claims meet formal requirements estab-
lished by the governing council. Panels of three commissioners would hear
testimony and render recommendations that are final, subject only to the ap-
proval of the governing council. With claims expected to exceed available re-
sources, the governing council would establish criteria for allocating funds, such
as distinguishing between Kuwait on one hand, and other countries.
Although the U.N. attempted to tackle a proverbial legal octopus, the task of
sorting out, processing, and eventually paying war reparations in the aftermath of
the Gulf War will indeed involve a herculean effort. It may be an irony to
paraphrase Saddam Hussein in concluding that the U.N., although well inten-
tioned, may have created the "mother of all international arbitration battles."
19. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991).
20. U.N. Doc. S/22559 (2 May 1991).
21. Id.
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